In the 1990s, a large majority of funds with front-end loads introduced additional share classes, which allowed investors to pay annual fees and/or back-end charges instead of frontend loads. The transition to a multiple-class structure provides a natural experiment with regard to investor clienteles and fund performance. We examine (a) whether the new fee structures increase fund cash flows by attracting investors with different investment horizons and sensitivities to performance; (b) whether changes in the volatility and level of fund flows induced by new investor clienteles affect fund performance -despite little change in fund management and investment objectives. Our finding is that the multiple-class funds, after controlling for performance and fund attributes, attract significantly more new money than the single-class funds. Consistent with the clientele hypothesis, investors in the new classes tend to have a shorter investment horizon and a greater sensitivity to fund performance than investors in the front-end load class. The downside to introducing the new classes, however, is a significant drop in fund performance, which erodes the cash flow benefit of the new classes. Furthermore, the performance drop is shown to be increasing in the relative size of the new classes and in the volatility of their fund flows.
Introduction
Broker-intermediated mutual funds have traditionally been distributed with a front-end load, where the load represents the sales charge paid to brokers. In the 1990s, a large majority of funds with front-end loads introduced additional share classes. By allowing investors to replace front-end loads with higher annual fees and/or back-end charges, the new classes were intended to appeal to investor clienteles with different investment preferences. The transition to a multiple-class structure provides us with a natural experiment on investor clienteles and fund performance. Specifically, we examine whether the new fee structures increase fund cash inflows by attracting investor clienteles significantly different from those in the existing funds. We then investigate the impact of the changes in volatility and level of fund flows, induced by the new clienteles, on fund performance. A major advantage of the multiple-class setting is that it permits us to investigate the above issues while keeping fund management and investment objectives virtually unchanged.
Mutual funds are sold to retail investors through various distribution channels. The traditional and still important distribution channel is the so-called 'advisor' or 'broker' intermediated channel in which financial planners and brokers play a primary role in selling a fund and in providing information and other services to investors. The mutual fund marketplace changed dramatically after the 1980s with the arrival and the evident popularity of directly marketed no-load mutual funds. Since the 1990s, some no-load funds have also been offered by discount brokers through fund supermarkets. As we would expect, the channels used to distribute no-load funds are characterized by low selling costs and limited investor services.
As mentioned, a significant and relatively recent development in the broker intermediated channel is the availability of multiple classes on the same underlying fund portfolio. The classes are usually denoted A, B and C. The A class investors pay front-end loads as a sales charge to compensate brokers. Traditionally, this was the only type of fee structure available to a retail investor. In the 1990s, brokered funds expanded their menu and began to offer classes with different fee structures. The B class charges an annual 12b-1 fee of about 1 percent and a contingent deferred sales load (CDSL) up to 5 percent upon exit.
This back-end charge typically declines with the investment periods. The C class charges a lower contingent deferred sales load than the B class and a similar 1 percent annual 12b-1
fee. An advantage of the class B shares, however, is that they are converted into class A shares after six to eight years, thereby lowering the annual 12b-1 fee.
We begin our analysis by examining whether a switch from an A class fund to a multipleclass fund increases the overall cash inflow. Our finding is that, cross-sectionally, the net cash flow to multiple-class funds (aggregating across classes) is significantly larger than that to single-class funds, controlling for performance and various fund characteristics. The cash flow differences between multiple-class and single-class funds cannot be attributed to differences in cash flow prior to the introduction of new share classes. The increase in cash inflow upon adoption of a multiple-class structure, accounting for factors such as performance, expenses and fund size, is estimated to be about 4 percent on an annual basis. Given the average fund size, this is of the order of 30 million dollars per fund on an annual basis.
To understand the nature of investor clienteles, we first examine whether introducing the new classes has negative cash flow consequences for the existing A class. The notion is that if there is such cannibalization, some existing investors in class A would have preferred one of the new classes -had it been available to them. However, controlling for past performance and other fund attributes, we find no evidence of a decrease in cash inflow to the A class after the introduction of additional fund classes. The finding suggests that the investor clienteles attracted to the new share classes were not previously served by the A class.
Since the three classes on a fund obtain the same NAV return -prior to expenses and sales charges -this allows us to compare the cash flow responses to different fee structures in a controlled setting. Given the structure of the sales charges associated with the fund classes, it is apparent that investors with relatively long investment horizons would prefer the A class with its up-front load and lower annual charges, while those with more uncertain and shorter horizons would prefer the B or C class. The importance of investment horizon is frequently discussed in the popular press and fund prospectuses. Investors may have a specific time by which they need their investment dollars. However, investor preferences may also be determined by the value an investor places on having flexibility to move between investments.
Hence, an investor who believes that she might identify good investment opportunities in the future or has some concern about the quality of a fund would prefer class C to the other two classes. The empirical prediction that follows from the above discussion, therefore, is that the cash flow response to fund performance and the overall cash flow volatility should be highest for the C class. Empirical results confirm the above prediction, supporting the notion of different investor clienteles.
The introduction of new classes may also have an impact on fund performance, as it changes the overall volatility and the level of fund cash flow. It has been argued in the literature that higher cash flow volatility and level would tend to have an adverse effect on a fund's performance on account of liquidity costs and decreasing returns to scale (see e.g., Edelen (1999) , Nanda, Narayanan and Warther (2000), Berk and Green (2002) , Chen et al. (2002) , Rakowski (2002) , and Stein (2003)). The argument plays an important role in explaining the empirical finding that performance persistence and smart money effect (see Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999)) are short lived. As investors chase past performance, the increase in the volatility and level of fund cash flow would tend to equalize the expected abnormal returns across funds. Hence, even if performance reflects superior investment skills, we would not expect the performance and the smart money effect to persist in equilibrium.
By focusing on the change in performance upon the adoption of a multiple-class structure, we are able to directly investigate the extent to which performance is adversely affected by the change in cash flow volatility and level. Compared to the existing cross-sectional studies, our approach has the advantage of identifying the impact of cash flow volatility and level on fund performance while holding managerial ability and investment objectives virtually unchanged.
Our results indicate that introducing new share classes results in a significant deterioration in fund performance. The four-factor adjusted performance is found to decline by about 1.4 percent on an annual basis, both before and after controlling for expenses. The estimated impact of fund performance on cash flow suggests that the new money growth decreases by about 2 percent on an annual basis due to the performance drop. Further tests indicate that the decline in fund performance is significantly increasing in the cash flow volatility of the new classes as well as in their relative size. This provides new direct evidence consistent with the argument in the literature that increase in cash flow volatility and fund size erodes fund performance.
We also investigate whether economies of scale and decrease in fund expenses affect a fund family's decision to introduce new share classes. An obviously important consideration here is the cost of introducing new classes and how the cost burden can be shared. The fact that there may be economies of scale in introducing new classes is suggested by the observation that, when fund families introduce new classes, they tend to do so for many of their funds at the same time. If economies of scale are important, then larger fund families would be in a better position to bear the costs and, hence, be more likely to introduce new classes. Consistent with this notion, we find that larger fund families are significantly more likely to introduce new share classes than smaller families. In terms of operating expenses, we find that compared to single A class funds, funds that introduce new share classes tend to charge lower operating expenses (non 12b-1 fee) before the switch. However, there is no evidence that these funds further reduce the charge for operating expenses after the switch.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 provides institutional details about the multiple-class and single-class funds. Section 4 describes data and summary statistics. Section 5 presents methodology and empirical results. We conclude in Section 6.
Literature Review
The existing research indicates that mutual fund flows are affected by past fund performance, load and expense charges, and fund advertising. Numerous studies, for example, Ippolito (1992), Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks (1994 ), Gruber (1996 ), Chevalier and Ellison (1997 , Goetzmann and Peles (1997) , Sirri and Tufano (1998), Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2000) , Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) have demonstrated that mutual fund flows chase past fund performance, especially stellar performance. Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that fund flows are negatively related to total fund expenses. Barber, Odean and Zheng (2000) and Wilcox (2003) find evidence that mutual fund investors pay more attention to load charges than expense ratios. Jian and Wu (2000) document that advertised funds attract significantly more new money in comparison to a group of control funds.
There is evidence that the mutual fund industry exploits the patterns in fund flows to maximize total assets under management. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find evidence that fund managers alter the riskiness of their portfolios at the end of the year to take advantage of the nonlinear shape of the performance-flow relation. Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2000) indicate that some fund families adopt strategies to increase the likelihood of creating a star fund in order to maximize their overall cash flows.
Despite the fact that mutual funds and complexes want to maximize their assets under management and thus profits, high cash flow volatility and large fund size may hurt fund performance due to liquidity costs and the difficulty of finding additional attractive investment opportunities. Nanda, Narayanan and Warther (2000) develop an equilibrium model of mutual fund size and structure, where fund performance can decline with the increase of fund size. Based on their model, funds attracting shorter horizon investors will be associated with greater cash flow volatility and worse performance. In a rational investor model, Berk and Green (2002) argue that new information on managerial ability will affect the cash flow. However, the increase in cash flow may have a negative impact on performance due to decreasing returns to scale. Stein (2003) investigates the importance of liquidity costs on the choice of an open-end or closed-end structure. Edelen (1999) and Rakowski (2002) provide empirical evidence on the negative relationship between cash flow volatility and fund performance. Chen et al. (2002) document that fund size adversely affects performance after controlling for other fund attributes.
A number of papers have studied the decisions of mutual fund families to start new funds and new share classes, for example, Khorana and Servaes (1999) and Zhao (2002) . Recently researchers have begun to examine the multiple share class structure of mutual funds. In an Investment Company Institute (ICI) study, Reid and Rea (2003) provide a comprehensive summary of mutual fund distribution channels and distribution costs for the past 25 years. Livingston and O'Neal (1998) compare the effect on investors of distribution fees for mutual funds with different types of sales arrangements. Lesseig, Long and Smythe (2002) document that multiple share class funds have lower administrative fees but higher management fees than single-class funds.
A large part of the existing empirical literature has treated the multiple share classes offered by the same fund as separate entities. Given that most investment and management decisions are made at the fund level rather than at the share class level, it is appropriate to analyze fund-level cash flow, performance, and other characteristics by aggregating across different share classes of the same asset portfolio. In this paper, we construct a unique data set of fund-level information adjusting for the multiple-class structure. The introduction of new share classes provides a setting in which we can study investor clienteles and their impact on fund performance -while keeping fund management and investment objectives virtually unchanged.
Multiple-Class and Single-Class Funds
Multiple share classes of the same fund obtain returns from the same investment portfolio but differ in fees, expenses, and sales charges. We use the criteria outlined by the ICI to identify share classes. In our study, a fund is defined as a multiple-class fund if it offers either A, B, and C shares or A and B shares. In this section, we provide some institutional details about various share classes based on the ICI study by Reid and Rea (2003) . In particular, we focus on alternative load and fee 1 Many multiple-class funds offer other class types as well. For example, some share classes are specially designed for institutional investors or retirement plans. However, unlike A, B, and C classes, these share classes do not have an industry-wide standard regarding load and fee structures. Moreover, the naming of these share classes is often at the discretion of fund management, making classifications extremely difficult. For these reasons, we focus exclusively on the A, B, and C classes of multiple-class funds, which are offered to individual retail investors. Most multiple-class funds offer either A, B, and C three share classes or A and B shares. Very few funds offer the combination of A and C or B and C. We hence exclude them from our analysis.
2 Funds that only offer a single B or C class are rarely observed.
structures. We also discuss the empirical implications with respect to investors' selection of share classes.
Basics of Share Classes
Class A shares charge investors an up-front load as a percentage of total investment at the time of purchase. For example, if an investor invests $1,000 in A shares with a 5% frontend load, she would pay a $50 load charge to the broker and have a net position of only $950 in the fund. A typical load structure involves a maximum front-end load charged to investments below certain threshold (e.g., $25,000) and a schedule of load reductions for large investments. For investments above 1 million dollars, the fund typically waives the load charges altogether. Besides the front-end load, class A shares also rely on an annual 12b-1 fee to compensate brokers and financial advisors. Under SEC Rule 12b-1, a fund can use its assets to pay for distribution related services. For class A shares, the annual 12b-1 fee typically ranges from 25 to 35 basis points.
Class B investors are not subject to a front-end sales load at the time of initial investment.
Instead, class B investors pay for distribution related services through a combination of an annual 12b-1 fee and a contingent deferred sales load (CDSL). The annual 12b-1 fee is typically set at 100 basis points. The payment of CDSL, also called the back-end sales load, is contingent upon share redemptions and is based on the lesser of the original cost of shares at the time of investment and the current market value of the shares. A typical CDSL structure involves a maximum back-end load (about 5%) charged to investments redeemed during the first year and a schedule of load reductions for investments held longer. The pace of back-end load reductions is typically 1% per year. Hence, if an investor holds the class B shares for longer than six or seven years, she would not be charged any back-end load in case of redemption. Moreover, class B shares are typically converted into A shares after six to eight years, resulting in a reduction of the 12b-1 fee from 100 basis points to that of A shares.
Class C shares are sold to investors at net asset value without any front-end load charges.
Like class B investors, shareholders of the C class pay for distribution related services through a combination of an annual 12b-1 fee (typically 100 basis points) and a CDSL. However, the load and fee structure of class C differs from that of class B along two dimensions. First, the back-end sales load is set at 1% and is triggered only if an investor redeems her shares during the first year of investment. For shares held for more than one year, the CDSL is normally waived. Second, unlike B shares, C shares are not converted into A shares after six to eight years. In other words, class C investors have to pay the 100-basis-point annual 12b-1 fee as long as they hold the C shares.
Choice between A, B, and C Classes
For any multiple-class fund, all the three share classes are issued on the same underlying asset portfolio and thus have the same return before loads and expenses. Since the three share classes typically have the same non-distribution expense ratio, the difference in net returns (after loads and expenses) is mainly driven by the different payment schedules for distribution costs. Thus, investment horizons play an important role in determining the share class that would maximize an investor's net returns.
Reid and Rea ( The empirical prediction that follows from the above discussion, therefore, is that the cash flow response to fund performance and the overall cash flow volatility should be higher for the C class than for the A or B class.
Single-Class Funds
In recent years, other distribution channels have emerged to compete with the traditional 'advisor' or 'broker' intermediated channel. Among the most successful ones are the 'direct' channel and the 'supermarket' channel. The majority of the funds sold through these channels are no-load funds, which usually have a single class. A typical no-load fund has no sales load and an annual 12b-1 fee less than 25 basis points. Hence, compared to the A, B, or C share class in a multiple-class fund, no-load funds have significantly lower distribution costs. To keep distribution costs low, these funds carry out transactions with investors either directly as in the 'direct' channel or through discount brokers that offer mutual funds from a large number of fund sponsors. The latter channel is referred to as the 'supermarket' channel.
Some load funds have not adopted the multiple-class structure and only offer an A share class. These funds have load and fee structures that are similar to those of the A class of multiple-class funds, and are distributed mostly through the 'advisor' or 'broker' intermediated channel.
Data

Definition of Variables
Our data sample is based on the mutual fund database compiled by Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This data set provides information on fund complex, monthly fund total net assets (TNA), monthly fund returns, and annual fund characteristics (expense ratio, 12b-1 fee, load, turnover ratio, etc.) for all open-end mutual funds, including defunct funds.
For our study we include all diversified U.S. equity funds over the period from January 1993 to December 2002, for which we manually identify fund class (A, B, C or no-load) information.
Our sample excludes sector funds, international funds, and balanced funds. We focus on the post-1992 period during which the majority of multiple share classes emerged.
The CRSP mutual fund database treats the multiple share classes offered by a fund as different entities. We manually identify the multiple share classes of a fund according to fund names and compile fund-level information by aggregating across the share classes. For most share classes, the recorded names provide us with information about the nature of the classes (A, B, C, or no-load). To ensure the accuracy of class coding, we verify the distribution-related costs (sales loads and 12b-1 fees) for each reported share class based on the criteria discussed in Section 3. For our analyses, we use both fund-level and class-level information.
The new money or cash flow of a multiple-class fund is calculated as the sum of new money across all share classes. For each share class, new money is defined to be the dollar change in TNA, net of price appreciation in the class assets. Assuming that new money is invested at the end of each month, the cash flow for class i in month t is given by
where R it is the rate of return of class i in month t. For a multiple-class fund f , the fund-level new money is
Normalizing the new money by fund-level TNA at the beginning of the month gives a measure for fund-level new money growth:
The fund-level expense ratio, 12b-1 fee, non 12b-1 expense (expense ratio net of 12b-1 fee), and front-end load are calculated as the TNA-weighted average of the corresponding class-level measures.
Finally, we calculate risk-adjusted returns to measure the performance of funds and share classes. Specifically, we calculate the CAPM one-factor, Fama-French (1993) three-factor, and Carhart (1997) four-factor adjusted returns at both the class and fund levels. For a multiple-class fund, the fund abnormal return is the TNA-weighted average of its class returns. We use the following OLS regressions to estimate factor loadings and α measures:
where R i is the rate of return of class i, RF is the one month T-bill rate, R m is the rate of return of the market, RMRF≡ R m − RF is the excess market return, SMB is the rate of return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor in stock returns, HML is the rate of return on the mimicking portfolio for the book-to-market factor in stock returns, MOM is the rate of return on the mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in stock returns, α is the excess return of the corresponding factor model, and βs are the factor loadings of the corresponding factors. Using the estimated factor loadings (βs) and excess return α, we define the risk-adjusted return (α it ) as
4.2 Summary Statistics Figure 1 , the difference reflects the industry trend that many funds switched to a multiple-class structure by adding B and C classes to the existing A class during the sample period. Despite the decrease in the number of single A class funds, we do not observe a drop in the total number of single-class funds due to the rapid growth of no-load funds. The multiple-and single-class funds exhibit a significant difference in expense ratios. The average expense ratio for multiple-class funds ranges from 1.55% to 1.69%, about 35 basis points higher than that for single-class funds. The difference in expense ratios is mainly driven by the annual 12b-1 fee. Multiple-class funds on average have an annual 12b-1 fee of 50 basis points, compared to around 10 basis points for single-class funds. On the other hand, the non 12b-1 expense for single-class funds on average exceeds that for multiple-class funds by more than 10 basis points, indicating some economies of scale in operating costs due to the larger size of multiple-class funds. The average sales load for multiple-class funds appears quite stable (about 3.00%) over the time period. However, for single-class funds, the average sales load decreases from 2.26% in 1993 to 0.58% in 2002, mostly due to the rapid growth of no-load funds in the industry.
In Table 2 , we document summary statistics for the sample of multiple-class funds with all three share classes. For an average multiple-class fund over our sample period, the A class is the largest in terms of TNA, followed by classes B and C. In 2002, the average TNA for the A class is about 552 million dollars, in comparison to 208 million dollars for the B class and 72 million dollars for the C class. Compared to classes B and C, the A class on average has a much lower expense ratio: 1.30% vs. 2.00%. Much of the difference in expense ratio can be attributed to the annual 12b-1 fee. The annual 12b-1 fee for an average A class is around 25 basis points, while the fee for an average B or C class is around 100 basis points. On the other hand, the non 12b-1 expense ratios are very similar (around 1.10%) for the three share classes. As expected, among the three share classes, class A has the highest front-end load (more than 5%). The difference in load and fee structures among share classes reflects the alternative payment arrangements for the distribution-related services.
Finally, we report in Table 3 
Methodology and Empirical Findings
In this section, we first examine whether switching from a single-class to a multiple-class structure increases new money flows to the fund, after controlling for past performance and other fund attributes. We then investigate whether different share classes attract substantially different investor clienteles in terms of investment horizon and response to fund performance. We next study the effect of the change in fund flow volatility and level on fund performance. Finally, we explore whether economies of scale are associated with a fund family's decision to introduce new share classes.
The Impact of the Multiple-Class Structure on Fund Cash Flow
We begin our analysis by examining whether a switch from an A class fund to a multipleclass fund increases cash inflow, controlling for past performance and other fund attributes.
Specifically, we use fund-level information to estimate the following pooled regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE):
Here, f is the index for fund and t is the index for month. Other than the dummy variable indicating the multiple-class structure, the other variables are similar to those used in the performance-flow literature as discussed in Section 2. The variable (Newmoneygrowth) is given by equation (3). The variable (Past Perf.) measures past fund performance by calculating the average monthly one-factor, three-factor, and four-factor adjusted alphas during the corresponding 12-month interval. In addition to past performance, we control for the potential impact of fund size, fund family size, fund age and expense ratio on cash inflow.
Family size may have an impact on cash flow due to the search costs as documented in Sirri and Tufano (1998). We measure fund size (Log Fund TNA) by the logarithm of fund-level TNA and measure family size (Log Family TNA) by the logarithm of family-level TNA.
The family-level TNA is the sum of the TNAs across all member funds. We measure the fund age (Log Fund Age) by the logarithm of the age for the oldest share class in the fund.
The fund-level expense ratio (Expense) is defined as in the previous section. Estimating the regression with PCSE, we allow the error terms to have heterogeneous variances across funds and to follow a common AR(1) process over time.
To capture the impact of multiple-class structure on new money growth, we use an indicator variable. The variable (Multiple Dummy) equals one if the fund has multiple share classes, and equals zero otherwise. The coefficient estimate on the (Multiple Dummy) captures the mean difference in new money growth between multiple-class funds and singleclass funds.
We present the estimation results for regression equation (8) in Table 4 that mutual fund investors respond more to the recent performance. We also find that new money growth is inversely related to fund size. Consistent with Sirri and Tufano (1998), funds belonging to larger fund families have significantly higher cash inflow, possibly due to the search costs of investors and the effect of brand names attached to larger fund families. We find no evidence that fund age has significantly independent effect on cash inflow.
Consistent with Barber, Odean and Zheng (2000), cash inflow is positively and significantly related to fund expense ratio in the regression based on 1-factor model. The coefficients based on other models are positive but not statistically significant.
Next, we study whether the difference in new money growth between multiple-class and single-class funds is due to self-selection factors, i.e., funds that introduce new share classes may intrinsically have higher new money growth even before the switch. Specifically, we compare the cash inflow of funds that switch to a multiple-class structure in our sample period to that of single-class funds before and after the switch. Note that, compared to regression (8), the data sample used in this regression excludes funds that started with a multiple-class structure at the beginning of our sample period. We use two indicator variables. The variable (Pre-Multiple Dummy) is assigned a value of one if the fund has a single A class in the current period but subsequently switches to a multiple-class structure.
The variable (Post-Multiple Dummy) is assigned a value of one if the fund has a multipleclass structure in the current period. If a fund remains a single-class fund (either A or no-load) throughout the sample period, then the two dummies are assigned a value of zero.
A significant coefficient estimate on the (Pre-Multiple Dummy) will support the self-selection hypothesis.
As reported in Table 5 , the coefficient estimates for the (Pre-Multiple Dummy) are negative and statistically insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence that funds that switched to a multiple-class structure were attracting relatively more new money even prior to introducing new share classes. The coefficient estimates for the (Post-Multiple Dummy) are slightly higher than those reported in Table 4 , indicating a roughly 5 percent increase in annual cash inflows after introducing new share classes. The coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
In summary, empirical evidence suggests that, compared to a single-class fund, a multipleclass structure attracts more cash inflows after controlling for other factors. As we will see, the increase in new money is, however, partially offset by a significant drop in fund performance and thus its negative impact on fund flows.
New Share Classes and Investor Clienteles
In this section, we investigate whether the new share classes attract substantially different investor clienteles. We begin by examining the impact on cash flows to the existing A class.
If some investors that invested in the A class in the past would have preferred alternative payment arrangements for the sales charges, then the cash flows for the existing A class will decline after the introduction of new share classes. We explore the possibility of such cannibalization by regressing new money growth for the A class in multiple-class funds on the (Pre-Multiple Dummy) and (Post-Multiple Dummy), controlling for other factors that may affect the cash inflow as in regression (8). The regression is estimated using class-level information.
We report the coefficient estimates in Table 6 . As we observe, the coefficient estimates Next, we examine whether the new share classes cater to different investor clienteles, as claimed by the mutual fund industry. An empirical implication from this claim is that investors of these different share classes may have different investment horizons and preferences and thus would display different patterns of cash flow behavior. As discussed, the cash flow response to fund performance and the overall cash flow volatility are expected to be relatively higher for the C class.
In Table 7 , we compare the average new money growth and cash flow volatility between different share classes. As we observe, the average new money growth is significantly higher for class C than for classes A and B. Next, for each month in the sample period we measure the cash flow volatility for the A (B or C) class as the standard deviation of new money growth across all the A (B or C) classes. Given the three time series of volatility measures (one for each class), we report the mean volatility for each share class and the results of paired t-tests. As reported, the C class clearly has the highest cash flow volatility. The paired tstatistics suggest that the differences in the mean volatility are statistically significant at the 1 percent level for class A vs. class C and class B vs. class C.
To investigate the flow-performance relation for different share classes, we focus on the multiple-class funds with all three share classes and estimate the following pooled regression with PCSE using class-level information: 
Except for family size (Log Family TNA), all other variables in the above regression are class-level measures. The last two regressors are the interaction terms between performance in the past 12 months and class dummies. The indicator variables (Class B Dummy and Class C Dummy) are assigned a value of one if the class is a B or C, respectively. The coefficient estimates on these interaction terms capture the differences in the cash flow response to past performance for the B and C classes relative to the A class. Table 8 presents the coefficient estimates for regression (9). The coefficient estimates for the interaction of C class dummy and performance are positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient estimates for the interaction of B class dummy and performance are positive but smaller in magnitude than those of C class. The interaction term for B class is significant at the 5 percent level when we measure performance by the four-factor model.
The result suggests that, compared to the A class, the cash flows of the B and C classes are more responsive to past performance, with C class being the most responsive. For a one percent increase in monthly one-factor alpha, the cash flow responses for classes B and C are 0.11 and 0.54 percent (on a monthly basis) larger than that for the A class, respectively. The above results support the notion of different investor clienteles, i.e., the new share classes attract investors with different preferences than those in the A class.
Multiple-Class Structure and Fund Performance
Given the finding that a multiple-class structure affects the level and volatility of a fund's cash flows, we will now examine the impact of these cash flow changes on fund performance.
As we have noted, a significant advantage to analyzing performance impact in this setting is that though there are substantial changes in cash flow characteristics -there is virtually no change in the management or investment objectives of the fund. Edelen (1999), Nanda, Narayanan and Warther (2000) and Rakowski (2002) point out that cash flow turnover can decrease fund performance due to liquidity costs. Berk and Green (2002) and Chen et al. (2002) indicate that large fund size can hurt performance due to decreasing returns to scale. Stein (2003) suggests that money withdrawals can negatively affect fund performance since it restrains a fund's ability to take on arbitrage positions. We test to see whether the additional money flow and the higher volatility associated with the new classes would affect fund performance.
We first identify the impact of switching to a multiple-class structure on fund performance. Specifically, we compare the risk-adjusted returns of the A shares of multiple-class funds to that of single-class funds before and after the switch by estimating the following pooled regression with PCSE:
All variables are defined as in Section 4.1 and in regression (8). For funds that switched to a multiple-class structure, β 5 and β 6 capture the performance differences relative to the single-class funds before and after the switch, respectively.
The regression results are presented in Table 9 . Before switching to a multiple-class structure, the A class funds on average have a similar or slightly better performance relative to the other single-class funds before or after expenses. However, after introducing new share classes, multiple-class funds underperform their single-class counterparts by 1.3 to 2 percent on an annual basis before or after expenses. The underperformance is significant at the 1 percent level. Thus evidence suggests that the introduction of multiple classes deceases the performance of a fund. Based on the estimated impact of fund performance on cash flow in regression (8), we infer that the new money growth decreases by about 2 percent on an annual basis due to the performance drop.
Next, we explore the causes of the inferior performance after introducing new share classes. Specifically, we investigate whether the negative effect on fund performance of a multiple-class structure is related to the increased volatility in cash flows and/or the decreasing returns to scale as a result of additional money flows. As suggested in the literature, the drop in performance can be the result of an actual increase in the costs associated with investing a more volatile cash flow. In addition, the increased level of cash flow could have a negative impact on fund performance due to the difficulty of finding additional attractive investment opportunities. For instance, the price impact of investing a larger amount will tend to decrease investment returns.
We focus on the performance of multiple-class funds after the switch. Within this group, we examine the impact of the cash flow volatility of B and C classes combined, and the relative size of B and C classes to A class. Negative and significant coefficients on cash flow volatility and on relative size would suggest that liquidity costs and fund size negatively affect fund performance. We estimate the following pooled regression with PCSE:
Here, (B&C Flow Vol) measures the standard deviation of the combined B and C cash flow in the previous 12 months, and (B&C Relative Size) is calculated as the ratio of the TNA of B and C classes to the TNA of class A for each fund f. The regression results are reported in Table 10 . The coefficients on the (B&C Flow Vol) are negative and significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that the cash flow volatility of the new classes adversely affects fund performance. The coefficients on the (B&C Relative Size) are also negative, indicating that the increase in fund size due to the new classes erodes fund performance. However, the significance of this finding decreases as we move from the one-factor alpha to the fourfactor alpha, suggesting that part of the performance difference may be due to investment styles and momentum in stock returns. Overall, our results provide direct new evidence consistent with the notion that increased fund size and cash flow volatility negatively affects fund performance.
Economies of Scale
Empirical evidence suggests that, compared to a single-class fund, a multiple-class structure attracts more cash inflows. On the other hand, the money inflows and higher cash flow volatility due to the new classes appear to erode fund performance. While multiple-class funds have grown rapidly since mid 1990s, many funds appear to have waited for several years before adopting the multiple-class structure and some funds remain as single-class.
Several factors, such as economies of scale and past fund performance, may affect fund management's decision to introduce multiple share classes.
We estimate a logit model to explore the relevant fund and family characteristics that affect the probability of switching to a multiple-class structure: fund performance in the past three years, fund family performance in the past three years, the size of the fund family, and the age of the fund.
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As shown in Table 11 , the family size has a positive impact on the probability of introducing new share classes. The evidence seems to support the notion of economies of scale:
Larger fund families may find it more cost effective to adopt the multiple-class structure than smaller families. There is marginal evidence that younger funds are more likely to have the multiple-class structure. There is no clear evidence that past fund or family performance affects the decision to switch to a multiple-class structure.
Since a multiple-class structure increases fund size, it may further increase the benefits of economies of scale by lowering the fixed costs. To better understand the change in expenses before and after introducing new share classes, we compare the expenses of multiple-class funds to those of single A class funds using the following pooled regression:
We also investigate how the two types of funds differ in 12b-1 fees and non 12b-1 expenses (defined as Expense minus 12b-1 fee) by separately regressing these two components of the total expense on the same set of regressors. lower expense ratios (about 20 basis points) than single A funds both before and after the switch. Compared to the single A funds, the 12b-1 fees for multiple-class funds are on average 12 basis points higher before the switch and 14 basis points higher after the switch. This result suggests that multiple-class funds charge higher distribution fees before the switch and increase the distribution fees slightly afterwards. On the other hand, the non 12b-1 expenses for multiple-class funds are on average 32 basis points lower than those for single A funds both before and after the switch. Consistent with the finding that larger fund families are more likely to introduce new share classes, we find that multiple-class funds charge lower non 12b-1 fees before the switch, possibly due to economies of scale. However, despite the increase in fund size due to the new share classes, there is no evidence that investors benefit from additional economies of scale by paying lower operating charges after the switch. When we control for fund size, age, and family size in the regressions, the results remain qualitatively similar despite a drop in the magnitude of the coefficients.
In summary, there is evidence that economies of scale play an important role in a fund family's decision to adopt the multiple-class structure. However, there is no evidence of a drop in operating expense charges (non 12b-1 fees) after introducing the new share classes, despite the increase in fund size. It is possible, of course, that savings on operating expenses are realized, but not passed through to investors.
Conclusion
Introducing multiple share classes on a fund portfolio has been a major development in the mutual fund industry in the past decade. As a result, the majority of load funds now have multiple-class structures. As many of these multiple-class funds were evolved from single-class funds, they provide us with a natural experiment to examine the impact of fee structures on fund cash flows as well as the impact of cash flows and flow volatilities on fund performance.
Studying a large sample of U.S. equity funds from 1993 to 2002, we find that multiple-class funds attract more new money than single-class funds after introducing new classes, controlling for fund performance and other fund attributes. Furthermore, we document evidence that the cash flows for the C class are more volatile and more sensitive to fund performance, consistent with the notion that the new share classes attract different investor clienteles. On the other hand, the empirical tests indicate that multiple-class funds experience a significant drop in performance after introducing the new classes. Further tests suggest that the drop in fund performance is related to the relative inflow of money due to the new classes and the volatility of their money flow.
The findings in the paper contribute to a better understanding of the effects of having multiple classes. The empirical results also provide insights into the issues of how fee structures affect fund cash flows and how cash flows affect fund performance. The findings provide new empirical evidence supporting the notion that liquidity costs and decreasing returns to scale due to increased cash flow volatility and fund size adversely affect fund performance.
Table 1. Summary Statistics: Multiple-Class Funds vs. Single-Class Funds
The table reports annual summary statistics for multiple-class funds and single-class funds. For each year from 1993 and 2002, we count the number of funds and number of fund families with and without the multiple-class structure. For both multiple-class and single-class funds, we calculate the mean statistics for the following measures: year-end total net assets (TNA), annual expense ratio, annual 12b-1 fee, annual non 12b-1 expense, and front-end load. The table reports annual summary statistics for the three share classes (A, B, and C) of multiple-class funds. For each year from 1993 to 2002, we count the number of funds and number of families that offer all three share classes. For each share class, we calculate the mean statistics for the following measures: yearend total net assets (TNA), annual expense ratio, annual 12b-1 fee, annual non 12b-1 expense, and front-end load. The table compares the cash flow difference between multiple-class funds and single-class funds using a pooled regression approach. The dependent variable is fund-level new money growth measured as the total amount of new money flowing into all share classes normalized by the previous month-end TNA of the fund. The independent variables include: the average monthly risk-adjusted returns over the consecutive 12-month periods in the past 60 months (Past Perf.), the square of the average monthly risk-adjusted returns over the last 12 months (Past Perf. Squared), the logarithm of fund-level TNA (Log Fund TNA), the logarithm of family-level TNA (Log Family TNA), the logarithm of fund age (Log Fund Age), the expense ratio (Expense), and the dummy variable (Multiple Dummy) indicating that a fund has multiple share classes in the current period. As a robustness check, we use one-factor, three-factor, and four-factor adjusted returns to measure past performance. We allow the error terms to have heterogeneous variances across funds and to follow a common AR(1) process over time. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All coefficients reported in the The table examines whether multiple-class funds intrinsically have higher new money growth than singleclass funds even before introducing new share classes using a pooled regression approach. The dependent variable is fund-level new money growth measured as the total amount of new money flowing into all share classes normalized by the previous month-end TNA of the fund. The independent variables include: the average monthly risk-adjusted returns over the consecutive 12-month periods in the past 60 months (Past Perf.), the square of the average monthly risk-adjusted returns over the last 12 months (Past Perf. Squared), the logarithm of fund-level TNA (Log Fund TNA), the logarithm of family-level TNA (Log Family TNA), the logarithm of fund age (Log Fund Age), the expense ratio (Expense), the dummy variable (Pre-Multiple Dummy) indicating that the fund has a single A class in the current period but subsequently switches to a multiple-class structure, and the dummy variable (Post-Multiple Dummy) indicating that the fund has a multiple-class structure in the current period. As a robustness check, we use one-factor, three-factor, and four-factor adjusted returns to measure past performance. We allow the error terms to have heterogeneous variances across funds and to follow a common AR(1) process over time. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All coefficients reported in the table are the actual coefficient estimates multiplied by 100.
Year
Number of Funds
Year
Number of Funds
New Money Growth (t) One-factor
Three-factor Four-factor Constant 2.14*** (3.63) The table examines the extent to which the overall growth of cash inflow for multiple-class funds comes at the expense of the existing A class using a pooled regression approach. The dependent variable is the new money growth for the A classes in multiple-class funds, the single A-class funds, or the no-load funds. The independent variables include: the average monthly risk-adjusted returns over the consecutive 12-month periods in the past 60 months (Past Perf.), the square of the average monthly risk-adjusted returns over the last 12 months (Past Perf. Squared), the logarithm of class-level TNA (Log Class TNA), the logarithm of family-level TNA (Log Family TNA), the logarithm of class age (Log Class Age), the expense ratio (Expense), the dummy variable (Pre-Multiple Dummy) indicating that the fund has a single A class in the current period but subsequently switches to a multiple-class structure, and the dummy variable (PostMultiple Dummy) indicating that the fund has a multiple-class structure in the current period. As a robustness check, we use one-factor, three-factor, and four-factor adjusted returns to measure past performance. We allow the error terms to have heterogeneous variances across funds and to follow a common AR(1) process over time. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All coefficients reported in the The table compares the cash flow-performance patterns for different share classes of the multiple-class funds using a pooled regression approach. The dependent variable is the new money growth for class A, B, or C. The independent variables include: the average monthly risk-adjusted returns over the consecutive 12-month periods in the past 60 months (Past Perf.), the square of the average monthly risk-adjusted returns over the last 12 months (Past Perf. Squared), the logarithm of class-level TNA (Log Class TNA), the logarithm of family-level TNA (Log Family TNA), the logarithm of class age (Log Class Age), the expense ratio (Expense), and the interactions between the average monthly risk-adjusted returns over the last 12 months (Past Perf. (t-12, t-1)) and the class B and class C dummies. As a robustness check, we use onefactor, three-factor, and four-factor adjusted returns to measure past performance. We allow the error terms to have heterogeneous variances across funds and to follow a common AR(1) process over time. Tstatistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All coefficients reported in the table are the actual coefficient estimates multiplied by 100.
Three-factor Four-factor Constant 2.08*** (3.38) The table examines the impact of a multiple-class structure on fund performance using a pooled regression approach. The dependent variable is the fund-level risk-adjusted return. The independent variables include: the logarithm of fund TNA (Log Fund TNA), the logarithm of family TNA (Log Family TNA), the logarithm of fund age (Log Fund Age), the expense ratio (Expense), the dummy variable (Pre-Multiple Dummy) indicating that the fund has a single A class in the current period but subsequently switches to a multiple-class structure, and the dummy variable (Post-Multiple Dummy) indicating that the fund has a multiple-class structure in the current period. As a robustness check, we use one-factor, three-factor, and four-factor adjusted returns to measure risk-adjusted performance. We allow the error terms to have heterogeneous variances across funds and to follow a common AR(1) process over time. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All coefficients reported in the table are the actual coefficient estimates multiplied by 100. The table examines the impact of cash flow volatility on performance using a pooled regression approach. The sample used in the analysis includes multiple-class funds with all three share classes (A, B and C). The dependent variable is the fund-level risk-adjusted return. The independent variables include: the logarithm of fund TNA (Log Fund TNA), the logarithm of family TNA (Log Family TNA), the logarithm of fund age (Log Fund Age), the expense ratio (Expense), the standard deviation of new money growth for share classes B and C combined in the last 12 months (B&C Flow Vol), and the ratio of TNA for B and C classes combined over the TNA for class A (B&C Relative Size). As a robustness check, we use one-factor, threefactor, and four-factor adjusted returns to measure risk-adjusted performance. We allow the error terms to have heterogeneous variances across funds and to follow a common AR(1) process over time. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All coefficients reported in the table are the actual coefficient estimates multiplied by 100. The table investigates what factors determine fund management's choice of class structure. We estimate a logit model to explore the relation between the probability of switching to a multiple-class structure and the potentially relevant fund and family characteristics: average monthly risk-adjusted fund-level performance in the last three years (Past Fund Perf.), average monthly risk-adjusted family-level performance in the last three years (Past Family Perf.), the logarithm of family-level TNA (Log Family TNA), and the logarithm of fund age (Log Fund Age). As a robustness check, we use one-factor, three-factor, and four-factor adjusted returns to measure risk-adjusted performance. Chi-square statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. The table investigates the difference in expenses between multiple-class funds and single A class funds using a pooled regression approach. The dependent variables are the annual expense ratio (Expense), the annual 12b-1 fee (12b-1 Fee), and the annual non 12b-1 expense (Non 12b-1 Expense). The independent variables include: the logarithm of fund TNA (Log Fund TNA), the logarithm of family TNA (Log Family TNA), the logarithm of fund age (Log Fund Age), the dummy variable (Pre-Multiple Dummy) indicating that the fund has a single A class in the current period but subsequently switches to a multiple-class structure, and the dummy variable (Post-Multiple Dummy) indicating that the fund has a multiple-class structure in the current period. We allow the error terms to have heterogeneous variances across funds and to follow a common AR(1) process over time. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All coefficients reported in the 
Performance (t) Performance (t) Onefactor
Threefactor
Fourfactor
Onefactor
Threefactor
Fourfactor
Constant
Performance (t) Performance (t) Onefactor
Threefactor
Fourfactor
Onefactor
Threefactor
Fourfactor
Constant
One-factor
